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VICTIMS' RESPONSES TO INEQUITY:
AN EQUITY THEORY APPROACH.

University — Université

U. of ALBERTA

Degree for which thesis was presented — Grade pour lequel cette thèse fut présentée

PH. D. PSYCHOLOGY

Year this degree conferred — Année d'obtention de ce grade

1980

Name of Supervisor — Nom du directeur de thèse

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

VICTIMS' RESPONSES TO INEQUITY:
AN EQUITY THEORY APPROACH

by

(C) ANDRE NORMAND GAREAU

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING 1980

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Victims' Responses to Inequity: An Equity Theory Approach" submitted by André Normand Gareau in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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date November 26, 1979

DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to the memory of Dr. Conrad Morrow; his seminars first interested me in the study of victims of inequity.

ABSTRACT

According to Walster, Walster and Berscheid's (1973) extensions of equity theory, victims of injustice are expected first to seek restitution, secondly to retaliate, and finally to justify the victimization as a last resort. The present study examined the assumptions underlying this sequential analysis, and tested the effects of two situational factors believed to influence victims' responses: the status of the harmdoer and the order of availability of equity-restoring responses.

The status of the harmdoer (high and low), the order of availability of equity-restoring response modes (justification-first and retaliation-first), and two delay conditions (immediate and delayed response) were manipulated in a 2x2x2 factorial design. During the course of an experiment which presumably was concerned with the assessment of a new educational approach, 64 women were given negative personal assessments; participants in two additional control groups were not given negative evaluations. Retaliation scores were obtained by providing the subjects with the opportunity to assess the person who had criticized them. Justification was measured by requiring the subjects to rate their own and the harmdoer's inputs and outcomes in the situation. A restitution measure was obtained by asking the subjects to rate their degree of interest in having an expert assess them.

The results failed to support the equity theory assumption that victims' responses in different response modes are negatively

correlated: responses in one mode of equity-restoration (justification, retaliation or restitution-seeking) did not preclude responding in the other two modes. The order of availability of response modes also did not yield the predicted findings: whether subjects were allowed to retaliate first or justify first did not produce differential rates of subsequent justification, retaliation, or restitution-seeking. These data cast doubt on the notion that victims accrue some store of "equity-restoring motivation" which, once satisfied, results in a lowered probability of participation in other equity-restoring behavior.

As predicted, victims of low-status harmdoers retaliated more than did victims of high-status harmdoers. Examination of the results indicated that lower rates of retaliation toward high-status harmdoers was related to the victims' perceptions of higher inputs for the high-status harmdoers.

Further analysis of the justification-item intercorrelations indicated a tendency for the victims to perceive inputs and outcomes in such a way as to allow them to perceive that they were being treated fairly. Victims may have been motivated to restructure their situation cognitively to make it appear fair. These observations are discussed in the context of recent research which indicates that the need to feel in control may override the need to restore equity.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Brendan Rule for her interest, assistance, and encouragement in all stages of this research. I would also like to thank the following members of my supervisory committee: Dr. B. Sinha, Dr. D. Kuiken, Prof. J. P. Johnston, and Dr. D. T. Miller.

Many thanks are also extended to my wife Mary, and to my family and friends who encouraged and supported me during my studies.

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years social psychologists have shown an increased interest in the processes underlying harmdoing acts. As researchers have attempted to specify the conditions under which individuals harm others, much of the research has focused on the "harmdoer" and his immediate social situation (e.g. Bandura, 1973; Berkowitz, 1965, 1969; Berkowitz and LePage, 1967; Milgram, 1963, 1965, 1965(a), 1965(b); Zimbardo, 1969). Surprisingly, the behavior and perceptions of the victim in a situation involving harmdoing or injustice have received little attention. Because of the importance of the perceptual and behavioral aftereffects of a harmdoing act, more attention should be focused on the victim. Since the victim is often not a passive recipient of the harmdoing act, it is essential to consider his reactions as well as those of the harmdoer. Failure to recognize the victim's potentially active role may lead to inappropriate conclusions. For example, after citing research showing that harmdoers are more likely to compensate smaller rather than larger claims, Walster, Walster and Berscheid (1973, p. 159) suggested that victims might be advised to reduce their demands in order to receive at least minimal compensation. However, this reasoning fails to consider that the victim is a potentially active agent for whom the reduction of demands for redress might lower morale and consequent efforts to redress the grievance. The aim of the following research was to augment knowledge concerning victims' responses to injustice,

because such information is essential to the understanding and prediction of outcomes in these situations.

Equity theory, as presented initially by Adams (1965), and elaborated by Walster et al. (1973), is currently the most comprehensive and widely accepted framework for organizing a variety of injustice and harmdoing phenomena. Within this theoretical framework researchers have recently investigated the perceptions and actions of the harmdoer following the act of doing harm to a victim (Berkowitz, 1962; Berscheid and Walster, 1967; Berscheid, Walster and Barclay, 1969; Berscheid, Boye and Walster, 1968; Lerner and Simmons, 1966; Macaulay and Walster, 1971; Rawlings, 1968). Walster et. al. (1973) have extended equity theory to the victim's behavior and perceptions, but these extensions have yet to receive empirical support. Very few studies have directly measured the behavior and perceptions of the victim of a harmdoing act (Austin and Walster, 1974; Bulman and Wortman, 1977; Hannah, 1972; Ross, Thibaut and Evenbeck, 1971). The present research represented an attempt to provide an empirical test of the Walster et al. (1973) application of equity theory to the behavior and perceptions of victims.

A major assumption of equity theory is that individuals evaluate the fairness of a situation by comparing their own relative outcomes with some other person's outcomes.[1] Although Adams' (1965)

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[1]An alternative view has been suggested by Lane and Messé (1972). In this approach, it is assumed that persons assess equity by first comparing their outcomes to an internal standard of fairness rather than to a comparison person. However, as Austin and Susmilch (1974) have pointed out, there are serious methodological flaws in the one study which claims to support the internal standard hypothesis. Consequently, this approach has remained largely undeveloped.

equity theory was primarily developed to deal with economic exchange situations, Walster et. al. (1973) have shown that the model may also apply to situations involving harmdoing, aggression, and injustice.

Basically, equity theory analyzes two-person interactions in terms of the participants' outcomes (rewards minus costs) and inputs (the participants' contributions to the exchange: assets minus liabilities). If the participants in an interaction receive approximately the same ratio of outcomes to inputs, the relationship is judged to be equitable; if the outcome/input ratios are unequal, there is inequity.

A central proposition of the theory is that individuals who discover that they are in an inequitable situation feel distress and attempt to eliminate their distress by restoring equity. This attempt to restore equity can take two forms: the actual alteration of his own and/or the other's inputs and/or outcomes (by retaliation and restitution-seeking), and the psychological restoration of equity by adjusting his perceptions of his own and/or the other's inputs and/or outcomes. This latter way of responding to inequity has been labelled justification since by its use participants convince themselves that the situation is fair after all.

The following are examples of justifications that might be used by victims. Each involves the distortion of one of the four elements (one's own and the other's inputs and outcomes) involved in the relationship.

1. The victim may believe that his exploitation brings him compensating benefits (the victim overestimates his outcomes).

2. The victim may believe that the harmdoer does not really gain very much (the victim underestimates the harmdoer's outcomes).

3. The victim may believe that the harmdoer worked very hard or suffered a great deal (the victim overestimates the harmdoer's inputs).

4. The victim may believe that his own efforts or contributions are quite minimal (the victim underestimates his own inputs).

In this manner equity theory has provided a conceptual framework to classify the victim's responses. However, little is presently known concerning the processes and factors affecting equity restoration by victims. The present research was an empirical exploration, conducted within this equity framework, of a number of potentially important factors affecting a victim's selection of equity-restoring methods. The three areas selected for study were the following: (1) the relationships between the equity-restoring modes used by victims (retaliation, justification and restitution-seeking), (2) the effect of the order of availability of the equity-restoring modes, and (3) the effect of the harmdoer's status on the equity-restoring methods used by the victim. These three major questions are further discussed in the following paragraphs.[1]

---

[1]Prior to the present study, considerable attention was focused on a number of issues surrounding the application of an equity theory framework to the study of victims' responses. Some of these questions include the problem of selecting relevant inputs and outcomes, and the subjective aspects involved in the determination of equity and inequity. Several pilot studies were conducted to shed light on these and related matters leading up to the present research. A description and discussion of this work is provided in Appendix A.

The relationships among the equity-restoring methods used by the victim. A basic question that has yet to be investigated concerns the assumption that victims follow a certain temporal pattern with respect to the three modes of restoring equity. The Walster et al. (1973) model assumes that within a given period of time, victims engage in only one mode of equity restoration. According to this view, victims are expected first to seek restitution, secondly to retaliate, and to justify only as a last resort. These assumptions are reflected in the following quotation:

> Undoubtedly, the victim's first response is to seek restitution. . . . When a victim finds that it is impossible either to elicit restitution or to retaliate against a harmdoer . . . he can justify his exploitation. (Walster et al., 1973, pp. 165-166)

This predicted order of preference for the three modes of equity restoration is based on the degree of improvement that each response mode affords. Thus, restitution both restores the equity in terms of actual inputs and outcomes, and also improves the victim's absolute level of outcomes. Retaliation restores the actual equity but without improving the victim's absolute level of outcomes. Justification is least preferred since it neither improves the victim's absolute level of outcomes, nor restores actual equity; equity is restored for the victim only psychologically. Within this scheme, it is assumed that victims first choose only one mode of response (restitution-seeking); victims are expected to employ other modes only if this first mode is unavailable. Retaliation may be used if restitution-seeking is unsuccessful, and justification may be used if retaliation is not feasible.

In the absence of confirming evidence, plausible alternatives can be suggested to Walster et al.'s (1973) proposed sequence of preferred modes of response. For example, victims might seize the first equity-restoring opportunity which presents itself, regardless of its mode. Another alternative to the Walster et al. (1973) sequence would be the view that victims first assess the possibilities of success in using the various response modes, and then select their response on the basis of that assessment. This view seems especially plausible for those real-life situations in which restitution and retaliation involve the risk of even greater victimization. It is also possible that victims who seek restitution may also retaliate, since those two responses can both combine to restore actual equity. As for justification, it does not appear compatible with retaliation and restitution-seeking, since the latter two modes require that inequity be consciously perceived by the victim; the nature of justification appears to involve the avoidance of such perceptions of inequity. However, strongly motivated victims may employ all available equity-restoring modes regardless of logical considerations.

In view of the variety of alternative possibilities, it is necessary to verify the sequence of victims' responses proposed in the Walster et al. (1973) formulation. A first objective of this study was therefore to determine whether victims who restore equity in one mode also restore equity in other modes. For example, are victims who justify less likely to retaliate or to seek restitution?

Are those who retaliate less likely to justify or to seek restitution? These questions were investigated within the present study.

The effect of the order of availability of the equity-restoring modes. As mentioned previously, one possible objection to the Walster et al. (1973) sequence of response selections is that victims might simply take the first equity-restoring opportunity that presents itself, regardless of its mode. According to this perspective, whether victims select one or the other of the response modes (restitution-seeking, retaliation, or justification) would depend on which mode happened to become available first. This view could still be compatible with the hypothesis that response selections tend to be mutually exclusive concerning the response modes. Thus, a victim who was first given the opportunity to retaliate, and who did retaliate, would not be expected to justify when that opportunity was subsequently presented. The reverse would be expected with victims who were first given the opportunity to justify, and then were later given the opportunity to retaliate. The role of the order of availability of the response modes was included as a factor in the present study.

It was hypothesized that victims would be more likely to respond in a given mode (retaliation, justification, or restitution-seeking) when that mode was made available first, compared to when it was made available after another response mode. This hypothesis was proposed for three reasons. First, the notion that victims will take the first means available to restore equity requires fewer

assumptions than alternative views that require victims to gauge the probable effectiveness of the equity-restoring possibilities in a situation. Secondly, if responses are mutually exclusive with respect to the response modes, then one would expect a lower rate of response in a different mode made available at a later time. Finally, a victim who has employed one mode of equity-restoration should be less inclined to employ another mode, as the motivation to restore equity should by then be reduced.

The reduced motivation to restore equity after a first response mode was made available might be partly attributable to the simple passage of time (a "cooling-off" process). In order to investigate this possibility, a delay variable was incorporated in the present study. Some subjects were given an opportunity to restore equity immediately after victimization; other subjects were required to wait a few minutes before a mode of equity-restoration was made available to them. Thus, the design permitted a more precise identification of the source of any reduced equity-restoring motivation indicated by lower rates of participation in a second mode of equity restoration.

The effect of the harmdoer's status on the victim's response. The order of availability of response modes and the time-delay between victimization and equity-restoration have both been identified as potentially important situational variables affecting the victim's responses. Another situational factor of potential importance is the status of the harmdoer. Recently Homans (1976) and Parcel and

Cook (1977) have called for research relating status and equity processes, citing the similarity between the areas of application of equity theory and status congruence theory (Kimberly, 1966, 1972). Both status consistency and equity theories state that the individual's status position and his reward allocation should be congruent. Equity theory states that rewards will be allocated on the basis of status, if status is perceived as an input in the situation.

The relevance of the status variable in the equity area is clearly illustrated by Lane's (1962) field study into the beliefs of working-class American men. Lane's research indicated that his lower-status respondents tended to justify their low outcomes relative to higher-income groups by employing justifications that were consistent with those suggested by an equity framework. These men justified their situation by underestimating their own inputs, overestimating the other's inputs, underestimating the other's outcomes, and overestimating their own outcomes. For example, one respondent justified the relatively higher incomes of the rich by emphasizing their greater compensating costs. This would constitute an example of justification through underestimating the other's net outcomes:

> I think that lots of times they (the rich) are never happy, because one thing is, the majority of them that are rich have got more worries. You see a lot more of them sick than you do, I think, the average. I think a lot of your mental strain is a lot greater in the higher class--in the rich class--than in the other. (Lane, 1962, p. 65)

The present research provided an experimental test of the hypothesis that victims of high-status harmdoers are especially prone to justify their situations by distorting the inputs and outcomes in

the situation. Also explored were the various explanations of the proposed link between the harmdoer's status and justifications of the victim.

One explanation for the greater justification following victimization by a high-status harmdoer (compared to victimization by an equal- or lower-status harmdoer) rests on a perceived dissimilarity of the harmdoer by the victim. In Lane's (1962) research, the working-class respondents may have been especially likely to distort the inputs and outcomes of the higher classes because these higher-status persons appeared remote and dissimilar to them. The perceived dissimilarity would make it easier for the victim to persuade himself that equity exists. An equal- or lower-status harmdoer would be less likely to be perceived as remote and dissimilar to oneself; this would make it more difficult for the victim to distort the harmdoer's inputs and outcomes in a manner that would be convincing to himself.

Another basis for greater justification by victims of high-status harmdoers is based on a process of status generalization. A higher-status person may be seen as generally more competent, skillful, or powerful. A person who is favorably evaluated on one dimension may be more favorably evaluated in general. This perception by the victim that the harmdoer has generally higher inputs may lead the victim to accept his lower outcomes relative to the harmdoer. Both the status generalization and the perceived remoteness explanations were explored in the present study.

If justification is more likely in the case of those victimized by high-status harmdoers, this would have implications for predictions concerning the other modes of responses (restitution-seeking and retaliation). As shown in the previous sections, the Walster et al. (1973) model assumes that responding in one mode of equity-restoration makes responding in other modes less likely. Thus, it would be expected that retaliation and restitution-seeking would be less likely for those victimized by high-status harmdoers; conversely, retaliation and restitution-seeking would be more likely for those victimized by low-status harmdoers. These hypotheses dealing with status and retaliation would be generally consistent with results obtained by researchers in the area of frustration and aggression.

In many studies involving verbal and written forms of aggression, researchers have found that humans direct relatively less aggression toward high-status than toward low-status frustrators (Cohen, 1955; Deaux, 1975; Graham, Charwat, Honig and Weltz, 1951; Gross, 1968; Kelley, 1951; Thibaut and Riecken, 1955). However, not all studies report lessened aggression toward high-status frustrators. Hokanson and Burgess (1962) reported no significant differences in amount of aggression expressed toward high- and low-status frustrators. Drost and Knott (1971) found that low-status harmdoers evoked lower levels of physical counterattack than did the same- and high-status harmdoers. The relationship between the harmdoer's status and retaliation is still unresolved, particularly in situations where the victim is also given the opportunity to justify and seek restitution. Therefore, the present study tested the effects

of the harmdoer's status on the victim's justification, retaliation, and restitution-seeking. Data were also collected to test the perceived dissimilarity and status generalization hypotheses as potential mechanisms to account for the predicted findings.

In summary, the following hypotheses were tested:

1. Victims who show a high rate of responding in one mode of equity-restoration (restitution-seeking, retaliation, or justification) show lower rates in the other two response modes.

2. Victims are more likely to respond in a given response mode when that mode is made available first, compared to when that response mode is made available after another response mode.

3. Persons victimized by high-status harmdoers show greater justification, less retaliation, and less restitution-seeking than those victimized by low-status harmdoers.

4. High justification, low retaliation, and low restitution-seeking are associated with high perceived dissimilarity of the harmdoer by the victim.

5. High justification, low retaliation, and low restitution-seeking are associated with perceptions that the harmdoer has a generalized high status.

METHOD

Subjects. The sample consisted of 88 female students who participated to fulfill part of their experimental participation credits for an introductory psychology class. The subjects signed up in appointment booklets that identified the experiment by a number and a code name. Although the subjects participated in pairs, any two subjects who were to run together signed up in different appointment booklets and waited for the experiment at different locations. Both of these measures served to minimize pre-experimental contact between the subjects.

Procedure. The two subjects were first brought into a central experimental room where the experimental procedure was explained (see Appendix B for the transcript of instructions to the subjects). The subjects were told that the study had a dual purpose: to assess the adequacy of a sample of educational material for an introductory counselling course, and to determine whether students could benefit from the experience of seeing and commenting on another student's work. They were then told that they would be working in separate rooms, ostensibly to control for subtle forms of non-verbal communications which were not the focus of the investigation. The subjects were told that in each room they would find an identical case history and a series of questions concerning an emotionally disturbed boy (see Appendix C for the case history and the questions). The

subjects were told that both of them would read the case history and the questions, but only one of them would find instructions to answer the questions immediately; the other subject was to wait until she had seen the other's answers, and made comments about them (actually both subjects found instructions to answer the questions immediately). The subjects were also told that they would be asked to complete additional forms that the experimenter would take to them in order to obtain their impressions of this method of introducing students to counselling concepts. When all the required forms had been completed, the subjects would be brought back to the main experimental room where any final questions could be discussed.

After ascertaining that the experimental procedure was clearly understood, the experimenter asked one of the subjects to flip a coin to allocate room assignment. This was done to convince the subjects that role allocations were to be done in an impartial and random manner. Each subject was then led to a small experimental room that shared a common corridor on either side of the experimenter's room. This arrangement permitted the experimenter to pick up materials from one room for delivery to the other without arousing suspicion when forms were substituted.

Once in their separate rooms, both subjects received written instructions to begin immediately. As the subjects finished answering the questions about the case history, the experimenter picked up their answers and told them that he would bring these to the other subject for rating, and that they would be returned in a few minutes. About five minutes later the experimenter returned with a standard

form (see Appendix D) supposedly containing the other subject's assessment of their work. At this point the manipulations of status, victimization, order of response availability, and delay were introduced.

Control for experimenter effects. Up to the moment before the administration of the victimization and status manipulations, the experimenter had no knowledge of the experimental conditions to which the subjects would be assigned. Assignment of subjects to conditions was achieved by the experimenter's random selection of a card from a jar. This effectively prevented the experimenter from treating subjects differently during the early stages of the experiment.

Victimization manipulation. All subjects received a uniformly positive evaluation of their work on the first part of their evaluation form. In the "comments" section of the evaluation, subjects in the victim conditions were told that although their answers were quite correct in theory, their actual performance in dealing with such a situation would be quite poor because they were too rigid, insensitive, and not perceptive enough. Subjects in the non-victim conditions were not given this negative personal assessment. It should be emphasized that in the context of this experiment the negative assessment is clearly an unjustified one, because subjects have the opportunity to see each other only for a few minutes during the presentation of the experimental instructions. Following such a limited

interaction, the receipt of the very negative comments would presumably constitute an unfair treatment. (It is acknowledged that the determination of fairness is a complex matter--some relevant considerations are discussed in the summary of preliminary work presented in Appendix A. Basically, the position adopted on this issue is that advocated by Walster et al. (1973); unfairness exists if it is so perceived by the victim. Further elaboration of this question is presented in following chapters.)

Status of the harmdoer manipulation. In the high-status conditions, the subjects received an evaluation form containing a remark that the subject rating the form had held a summer job as a camp administrator, where she had to deal with some emotionally disturbed children. In the low-status conditions, the evaluations contained the remark that the other student knew absolutely nothing about emotionally disturbed children.

Order of response availability manipulation. Two levels of response availability were introduced. In one condition, the subjects were given the opportunity to retaliate against the harmdoer before they were given the opportunity to justify their victimization. In a second condition this order was reversed. This was achieved by varying the order of presentation of two forms: the form on which the victim could retaliate by evaluating the other subject's work (see Appendix D) and the task evaluation form which was used to assess justification (see Appendix E).

Time delay manipulation. For one-half of the victimized subjects, the justification and retaliation measures were taken directly following victimization. For the other half of the subjects an interpolated task in the form of an information questionnaire (see Appendix F) was administered before any justification or retaliation measures were taken.

Retaliation measures. Retaliation scores were obtained by providing the subjects with an opportunity to rate the alleged work of the subject who had previously rated them. A standard form (see Appendix G) was in fact given to the subject for rating, and evaluations were made by the subject using the same form (see Appendix D) on which the subject's own work had been evaluated.

Restitution measures. The subjects were asked to rate their interest in seeing how an expert on emotionally disturbed children would rate their answers. In the present experimental situation this item can be interpreted as a measure of restitution-seeking; the subjects were given an opportunity to redress the inequity of the unfair evaluation by seeking another evaluation. Since this type of response can be seen as an attempt to restore equity by seeking an increase in one's outcomes, it is viewed as restitution-seeking.

Justification measures. A series of questions was designed to measure the subjects' assessments of their own inputs and outcomes, and their assessments of the other subjects' outcomes and inputs in

the experimental situation (see Appendix E). Included in these perceptions of inputs and outcomes are perceptions of effort, task difficulty, enjoyment, and educational benefits received.

Other measures. In order to provide checks on manipulations of victimization and status of the harmdoer, the subjects answered questions concerning the perceived fairness of their evaluations, and concerning the status of their harmdoers on dimensions of qualifications, friendliness, competence, education, and similarity to themselves. The latter measures were included to permit a test of the two explanations for the predicted status effects. In order to check for suspicion, the subjects were asked to describe "in their own words" the purpose of the study. They were also asked to indicate any thoughts, comments or suggestions that may have occurred to them during the experiment (see Appendix H). After all the measures were taken, both subjects were brought together for an explanation of equity theory and of the true purposes of the study.

RESULTS

The data from six subjects were discarded either because they suspected the purposes of the experiment, or because they suspected that the other subject was not the true source of the evaluations received. Two other subjects were eliminated from the analyses because post-experimental discussion revealed that they had been acquainted prior to the experiment. The results of the remaining 80 subjects (ten groups of eight subjects in each cell) were analyzed as follows.[1] First, the results of the 64 victimized subjects were analyzed in a 2x2x2 factorial design with two levels of harmdoer status, two levels of order of response availability, and two levels of time delay (no delay vs. an interpolated task before being given an opportunity to restore equity). The results of the two groups of non-victimized subjects were combined with the two corresponding groups (in terms of order and delay conditions) of victimized subjects, and analyzed in a 2x2 factorial design, with two levels of victimization and two levels of status. All subjects used in the latter analysis had experienced the same order of response availability (justification, then retaliation, then restitution-seeking), and no delay was imposed between the victimization and the response of the victim.

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[1]Since the subjects had been run in pairs, a preliminary analysis including the two-person factor was first performed. Since this procedure revealed no significant effect for the two-person group, the data were then analyzed using a cell n of eight subjects.

Manipulation check results: victimization. Compared to non-victims, victims rated the other's assessments of their answers as less accurate, on a question which asked them to rate the assessments from "very accurate" (1) to "very inaccurate" (7). The mean ratings were 4.19 for victims and 3.18 for non-victims ($F_{1,28} = 5.37$, $p<.025$). Victims also rated the other subject as less friendly than did non-victims. The mean ratings were 3.06 for victims and 2.06 for non-victims ($F_{1,28} = 6.45$, $p<.025$), on a scale ranging from "very friendly" (1) to "very unfriendly" (7).

Manipulation check results: status of the harmdoer. Subjects victimized by the high-status harmdoers tended to rate them as more qualified to assess their answers than did subjects victimized by low-status harmdoers. On a scale from "very qualified" (1) to "very unqualified" (7), the mean ratings were 4.09 for victims of high-status harmdoers and 4.72 for victims of low-status harmdoers ($F_{1,56} = 3.18$, $p<.08$). Although this difference is only marginally significant, subjects also rated the high-status harmdoers more favorably on all of the status and personal qualities scales: high-status harmdoers were rated more competent, more intelligent, more friendly, and better educated than the low-status harmdoers. The latter differences were not individually significant, but the absolute probability that such a positive pattern of results would occur by chance is only $(1/2)^5 = 1/32 = .03$. It therefore appears that both the victimization and status manipulations were effective. No checks were deemed appropriate for the order and delay manipulations.

Retaliation. On two of the four retaliation items, the main effect predictions for status of the harmdoer were confirmed. Compared to subjects victimized by high-status harmdoers, those victimized by low-status harmdoers gave their harmdoers lower ratings on an item concerning the practical nature of the suggestions. On a scale ranging from "very poor" (1) to "very good" (7), the mean ratings were 6.06 for those victimized by high-status harmdoers and 5.59 for those victimized by low-status harmdoers ($F_{1,56} = 4.97$, $p<.05$). On another retaliation item, subjects rated the harmdoers' knowledge of psychological principles on a scale from "very poor" (1) to "very good" (7). On this item, victims of low-status harmdoers gave lower ratings than victims of high-status harmdoers; the mean ratings were 5.38 for victims of low-status harmdoers and 6.74 for victims of high-status harmdoers ($F_{1,56} = 6.74$, $p<.02$).

The delay manipulation produced main effects on two retaliation measures. Compared to subjects who first completed an information questionnaire (the delay-condition subjects), subjects who were immediately presented with opportunities for justification or retaliation rated the harmdoers' work less favorably on the "choice of new approaches" item, which was evaluated on a scale from "very poor" (1) to "very good" (7). The mean ratings were 5.31 for the no-delay subjects and 5.81 for the delay subjects ($F_{1,56} = 4.09$, $p<.05$). A similar delay effect was found on victims' ratings of the harmdoers' "knowledge of psychological principles," on a scale from "very poor" (1) to "very good" (7). The mean ratings were

5.38 for victims under no-delay conditions and 5.97 for victims under delay conditions ($F_{1,56} = 6.74$, $p<.02$).

On the "knowledge of psychological principles" item, there was a significant interaction between the level of victimization and the status of the harmdoer ($F_{1,56} = 6.37$, $p<.02$). Inspection of Table 1 indicates that while victims gave lower ratings to low-status harmdoers than to high-status harmdoers, non-victims gave identical ratings regardless of the other's status. A comparison of means using the Scheffé (1959) method indicated that only the scores of the victimized groups were significantly different at the .05 level.

TABLE 1

MEAN RATINGS OF THE HARMDOER'S KNOWLEDGE

BY VICTIMIZATION AND STATUS OF HARMDOER

Condition of subject	Status of harmdoer	
	High	Low
Victim	5.88* a**	4.88 b
Non-victim	5.37 ab	5.37 ab

* a 7-point scale from "very poor" (1) to "very good" (7) was used

** entries bearing different subscripts are significantly different at the .01 level.

Justification measures. No main effects due to the status, delay, or order variables were obtained on the justification measures.

There was a significant triple interaction between the order, status, and delay variables ($F_{1,56} = 4.40$, $p<.05$), on the item relating to the subjects' perceptions of educational value received by themselves. Table 2 illustrates that under delay conditions, victims of high-status harmdoers rated their benefits as greater under justification-first conditions than under retaliation-first conditions, whereas victims of low-status harmdoers rated their benefits as greater under retaliation-first conditions. Under no-delay conditions, the opposite pattern of results was obtained: victims of high-status harmdoers rated their benefits as slightly higher under retaliation-first conditions than under justification-first conditions, and victims of low-status harmdoers rated their benefits as higher under justification-first conditions than under retaliation-first conditions.

TABLE 2

MEAN RATINGS OF VICTIMS'S EDUCATIONAL BENEFIT

BY STATUS OF HARMDOER, ORDER, AND DELAY

Status of harmdoer	Order of availability of equity-restoring modes	
	Retaliation-first	Justification-first
Delay conditions		
High-status	3.63*	4.50
Low-status	4.50	3.00
No-delay conditions		
High-status	3.88	3.63
Low-status	3.50	4.25

* a 7-point scale from "very little value" (1) to "very much value" (7) was used

Post-hoc comparisons of the means in Table 2, using the method of Scheffé (1959) did not reveal any differences significant at the .05 level.

Another significant triple interaction emerged on the justification item dealing with the victims' rating of their own ability ($F_{1,56} = 8.16$, $p<.01$). As illustrated in Table 3, under no-delay conditions, victims of high-status harmdoers rated their own ability as higher under retaliation-first conditions than under justification-first conditions; victims of low-status harmdoers rated their ability as higher under justification-first conditions than under retaliation-

first conditions. The opposite pattern was obtained under delay conditions: victims of high-status harmdoers rated their ability higher under justification-first conditions than under retaliation-first conditions, and victims of low-status harmdoers rated their ability higher under retaliation-first conditions than under justification-first conditions. A Scheffé (1959) post-hoc comparison of means failed to detect any significant mean differences.

TABLE 3

MEAN RATINGS OF VICTIMS' ABILITY

BY STATUS OF HARMDOER, ORDER, AND DELAY

Status of harmdoer	Order of availability of equity-restoring modes	
	Retaliation-first	Justification-first
Delay conditions		
High-status	4.00*	4.63
Low-status	5.12	3.75
No-delay conditions		
High-status	5.25	4.50
Low-status	3.63	4.13

* a 7-point scale from "very poor" (1) to "very good" (7) was used

Restitution-seeking measures. On the restitution question (desire to obtain an expert's evaluation of one's work), no significant main

effects were obtained. The means for a significant interaction between the order of availability and the delay factors are shown in Table 4 ($F_{1,56} = 4.54$, $p<.05$). When justification was available first, victims had a greater desire to seek an expert opinion under delay conditions than under no-delay conditions; when retaliation was available first, victims had more desire to seek an expert opinion under no-delay conditions than under delay conditions. A Scheffé (1959) post-hoc comparison of means failed to detect any significant differences between individual means.

TABLE 4

MEAN RATINGS OF VICTIMS' DESIRE

FOR AN EXPERT ASSESSMENT BY ORDER AND DELAY

Delay conditions	Order of availability of equity-restoring modes	
	Retaliation-first	Justification-first
Delay	6.56*	6.81
No-delay	6.87	6.19

* a 7-point scale from "not at all interested" (1) to "very much interested" (7) was used

Perceptions of the harmdoer. As mentioned in the manipulation check results, high-status harmdoers were rated more favorably on all of the rating scales; they were seen as more qualified, competent, friendly, intelligent and educated than the low-status harmdoers. Ratings of the friendliness of the harmdoer were also characterized by a

significant interaction between the status of the harmdoer and the order of availability of the equity-restoring modes ($F_{1,56} = 6.08$, $p<.02$). An inspection of Table 5 reveals that when given an opportunity to justify first, the victims rated the high-status harmdoers as more friendly than the low-status harmdoers; when the victims were given the opportunity to retaliate first, the low-status harmdoers were seen as more friendly than the high-status harmdoers.

TABLE 5

MEAN RATINGS OF THE FRIENDLINESS OF THE HARMDOER

BY ORDER AND STATUS OF THE HARMDOER

Status of harmdoer	Order of availability of equity-restoring modes	
	Retaliation-first	Justification-first
High-status	4.69*	5.44
Low-status	5.31	4.50

* a 7-point scale from "very unfriendly" (1) to "very friendly" (7) was used

Correlational results. A correlational matrix of the victims' response was obtained in order to test the hypothesis of a negative correlation among the victims' responses in different modes of equity restoration. The correlational analysis also permitted an evaluation of the hypotheses dealing with associations between victims' responses and their perceptions of the harmdoers. The correlation matrix contains 21 variables: nine justification items, four retaliation

items, one restitution-seeking item, two manipulation-check items for status of the harmdoer, and five items involving a generalized assessment of the harmdoer (see Appendix I for the complete correlation matrix).

The significance of the correlations was calculated according to a t test suggested by Hays (1963, p. 529), and the interpretation of a large correlation matrix followed the approach used by Gergen, Gergen and Meter (1972). They suggested that a matrix should first be examined to determine whether the number of significant correlations substantially exceeds the number which would be produced by chance factors. In this case 25 correlations were significant at the .01 level. With a total of 210 correlations, chance factors would be expected to produce only two correlations of this magnitude. There is, therefore, some basis for further consideration of individual correlations that are significant at the .01 level.

The only significant correlation involving two items from different equity-restoring modes was a correlation of .41 between the victims' perceptions of high educational benefit for themselves (i.e. high justification) and a high desire to have an expert evaluate their work (i.e. high restitution-seeking). The predicted association between high justification and perceived high status of the harmdoer was supported by only one correlation: subjects who saw the harmdoer as more competent also thought they themselves were receiving more educational value from the task (r=.38). On the other hand, three correlations were in the opposite direction: perception of a high educational benefit received by the harmdoer (i.e.

low justification) was correlated with perceptions of the harmdoer as highly competent (r=.38), highly educated (r=.36), and highly intelligent (r=.42). The latter three correlations thus indicate a belief that the harmdoer deserves his high outcomes, but there is no evidence that victims will justify by downgrading the high-status harmdoer's outcomes.

Some expected relationships were confirmed in the area of retaliation and the perceived status of the harmdoer. Perceptions of the harmdoer as competent and well educated were correlated with ratings that her choice of new approaches was good (r=.38 and .51, respectively). Thus, perceptions of high status were associated with low retaliation.

Within the equity-restoring mode of justification, five significant correlations were obtained, all of them consistent with the proposition that victims tend to perceive that they and their harmdoers are being treated fairly. Victims' perceptions that they exerted little effort were associated with low perceived educational benefits for themselves (r=.40); perceptions that the harmdoers exerted little effort were associated (r=.37) with perceptions that the harmdoers received little educational value (r=.40). Perceptions that the victims themselves exerted little effort were associated with perceptions that the harmdoers exerted little effort (r=.56). Perceptions that the victims themselves received little educational value were correlated with perceptions that the harmdoers also received little educational value (r=.37) and that the harmdoers received little enjoyment from the situation (r=.33).

DISCUSSION

The data of the present study have implications in three major areas concerned with victims' responses to inequity. First, the results of the status manipulations suggest important situational determinants of victims' responses. Secondly, the results bear on two major assumptions of equity theory concerning the effects of the order of availability of the equity-restoring modes, and the mutual exclusivity of the equity-restoring modes. Finally, the justification processes that emerged from the correlational analyses have interesting implications for the understanding of victims' motivations to reconstruct the psychological situation in which they find themselves.

It had been expected that persons victimized by high-status harmdoers would show greater justification, less retaliation and less restitution-seeking than those victimized by low-status harmdoers. The results indicated that under a variety of conditions (different orders of response availability, different delay patterns), victims showed more retaliation against low-status harmdoers than against high-status harmdoers. These results concur with a large number of human studies (Cohen, 1955; Doob and Gross, 1968; Graham, Charwat, Honig and Weltz, 1951; Thibaut and Riecken, 1955) that have reported higher rates of retaliation against low-status harmdoers than against high-status harmdoers.

However, some researchers in the area of status and aggression have reported no effects due to status of the harmdoer (Hokanson and Burgess, 1962), or have reported more retaliation against high-status harmdoers than against low-status harmdoers (Drost and Knott, 1971). Two factors may account for the differences between these results and the results of the present study. One possibility is that when the harmdoer has especially low status relative to the victim, the victim may feel so sorry for the harmdoer that retaliation is inhibited to a greater extent than toward a higher-status harmdoer. This might explain why the university student subjects in the Drost and Knott (1971) study retaliated more severely against a "research scientist" than against a "janitor." This interpretation would rest on the assumption that university students consider the janitor's position to be an especially low one.

The Drost and Knott (1971) study also differs from the present study in the relationship between the status manipulation and the form of the victimizing act. In the Drost and Knott (1971) study, the occupational status of the harmdoer (janitor vs. scientist) was not logically connected to the victimizing act (administration of electric shock). In this situation there was nothing about the position of the harmdoers which especially qualified them to administer the electric shock. In the present study, the status of the harmdoer (based on experience in dealing with disturbed children) was more logically related to the harmdoing act (criticizing the victim's probable performance in dealing with a disturbed child). Victims in the present study may have been especially reluctant to

criticize the high-status harmdoer in an area where the harmdoer had claimed some special expertise, even though the criticism was perceived as unfair. In other words, victims in the present study still could perceive some relevance between the high-status harmdoer's expertise and the unfair criticism received, whereas no such relevance was plausible in the Drost and Knott (1971) study. This comparison between the two studies supports Parcel and Cook's (1977) suggestion that "for an input to be weighted in the justice determination, it must be perceived as relevant to the exchange" (p. 312). Although a victimizing act may be seen as unfair by the victim, it is more likely to be tolerated when the victim perceives some relevance between the harmdoer's status and the victimizing act.

Since the high-status harmdoers were seen as more qualified, competent, intelligent, etc., the retaliation findings are consistent with the equity theory explanation that the greater acceptance of victimization from high-status harmdoers than from low-status harmdoers is a result of the perceived higher inputs of the high-status harmdoers. Alternately, the greater retaliation (in terms of lower ratings of the harmdoers' work) toward the low-status harmdoers might be seen as the result of a generalized low-status perception. In this interpretation the lower evaluation given to the work of the low-status harmdoers would not even be considered a retaliatory response. However, the significant interaction between the harmdoer's status and the victimization level (victim vs. non-victim) is not consistent with this interpretation: only victimized groups showed differences in retaliation toward high-status and

low-status harmdoers. This result argues against the view that low ratings of the harmdoer's work are simply a reflection of the status manipulation, regardless of victimization. If that were the case, non-victims as well as victims would have given the work of the low-status others a lower rating. Since the non-victims showed no such tendencies, the ratings made by the victims about the harmdoers' work can be confidently viewed as retaliatory responses directed toward the harmdoers.

Although the victims' retaliatory responses were influenced by the status of the harmdoer, the harmdoer's status did not significantly affect justifications of the victims. For two of the justification measures, however, interactions were obtained between the status, order, and delay variables. The interactions for the two justification items revealed opposite tendencies; no apparent patterns were discernible in these two interactions.

The victims' ratings of the friendliness of the harmdoer were not originally intended as a justification measure, but they might be so conceptualized if friendliness were seen as an input in social situations. Viewed in this perspective, it is interesting that victims' ratings of the friendliness of the harmdoer were characterized by a significant interaction between the status of the harmdoer and the order of availability of equity-restoring responses. When given an opportunity to justify first, victims rated the high-status harmdoers as more friendly than the low-status harmdoers; when given the opportunity to retaliate first, victims rated the low-status harmdoers as more friendly. If high ratings of friend-

liness are viewed as justifications because they involve higher ratings of the harmdoer's inputs, it would seem that the higher levels of justification with high-status harmdoers occurs only when the victim's first available mode of equity restoration is justification.

In conclusion, the relationships between the harmdoer's status and the victim's responses are partly consistent with the equity theory derivations that guided the present study. As predicted, victims were more likely to tolerate unfair treatment from high-status harmdoers than from low-status harmdoers. It was also shown that greater acceptance of victimization from high-status than from low-status harmdoers is associated with higher perceived inputs of the high-status harmdoers. It was suggested that one factor that may be critical for this effect is the victim's perception of a certain relevance between the harmdoer's status and the victimizing act. The effect of the harmdoer's status on the victim's justification and restitution-seeking responses is less clear, because the results revealed fewer and less consistent findings.

It had been hypothesized that victims would make greater use of a response mode (justification, retaliation or restitution-seeking) when the opportunity for it was presented first, compared to when it was presented after another response mode. However, no significant main effects were obtained for the variable of order of availability of equity-restoring modes: whether subjects could retaliate first or justify first did not produce differential rates of justification, retaliation, or restitution-seeking. A second hypothesis, related to but not identical with the first, also was

derived from Walster et al.'s (1973) equity theory: victims who show a high rate of responding in one mode or equity restoration tend to show lower rates in the other two response modes. The results indicated no support for the hypothesis of negative correlations among the subjects' responses in the different modes of equity restoration. Thus, the use of one mode of equity restoration seems unrelated to the use of other modes.

These results, therefore, provided no support for the view that inequitably treated individuals accrue some precise amount of equity motivation which, once satisfied, results in a lowered probability of participation in other equity-restoring behavior. These results are consistent with the findings of a recent study that also failed to support the traditional hydraulic model of equity restoration. Kenrick, Reich and Cialdini (1976) tested Lerner's (1974) unverified hypothesis that victim derogation would preclude subsequent compensation of the victim by observers. They found evidence of motivation to restore equity, but their data failed to support a traditional hydraulic model of equity restoration. Specifically, they found that observers' derogation of victims did not seem to inhibit compensation in the form of future helping. The authors concluded that compensation and derogation should not necessarily be seen as mutually exclusive alternatives, as was originally suggested by Walster et al. (1973) and by Lerner (1974). The relationship between the present study and the Kenrick et al. (1976) study is clear, since victim derogation can be seen as a form of justification (perceiving lowered inputs in victims), and compensation is

a form of restitution. Thus, the present study and the Kenrick et al. (1976) study both failed to support the assumption of mutual exclusivity in response modes, either in victims or in witnesses of victims.

In view of the lack of support for this critical aspect of the traditional hydraulic model of equity restoration, some of the alternative formulations mentioned in the introductory chapter should be reviewed. Walster et al. (1973) suggested that victims first seek restitution, retaliate when restitution is not available, and use justification as a last resort. However, the lack of order effects in the data of the present study indicated that this assumption may be incorrect. Whether retaliation or justification was available first did not affect the immediate nor the subsequent responses of victims as would be expected if there were a general order of preference among the alternative equity-restoring modes. It is suggested that future studies could offer victims a choice between the three equity-restoring responses of retaliation, justification, and restitution-seeking, in order to provide an even more definite test of the hypothesis that victims first seek restitution, then retaliate, then justify. (This approach was not followed in the present study because it was judged desirable to test first the assumption of negative correlations among the equity-restoring modes. If victims had been offered a choice among the three response modes, negative correlations would have been artificially produced.)

As an alternative to the Walster et al. (1973) suggested sequence of restitution, retaliation and justification, it was

suggested that victims might simply employ the first equity-restoring mode for which the opportunity was presented. However, the data from the present study do not support this interpretation. Whether victims were given the opportunity to retaliate first or justify first did not generally produce differential rates of justification, retaliation or restitution-seeking. Thus, neither the Walster et al. (1973) sequence nor the order of availability hypotheses adequately account for the selection of response modes.

Although the inter-mode dynamics between retaliation, justification and restitution-seeking did not operate as predicted by equity formulations, the correlational data exhibited striking evidence of a form of balance within the equity-restoring mode of justification. All of the significant justification-item intercorrelations indicated a tendency for victims to perceive that they and their harmdoers were being treated fairly, both on the basis of their own inputs and outcomes, and relative to the harmdoer.

First, victims perceived that their own inputs matched their own outcomes. Perceptions that they exerted little effort were associated with low perceived educational benefit for themselves. Secondly, the harmdoers' outcomes were seen as matching the harmdoers' inputs. Perceptions that the harmdoers exerted little effort were associated with perceptions that the harmdoers received little educational benefit. Third, the harmdoers' inputs were perceived to match the victims' inputs, as perceptions that the victims exerted little effort were correlated with perceptions that the harmdoers exerted little effort. Finally, the harmdoers' outcomes

were perceived to match the victims' outcomes. Perceptions that the victims themselves received little educational benefit were correlated with perceptions that the harmdoer also received little educational benefit, and with perceptions that the harmdoers received little enjoyment from the situation.

Thus, there is ample evidence that victims tended to perceive the inputs and outcomes in a manner consistent with hypotheses that victims will justify their situations. On the other hand, the manipulation check questions indicated that compared to non-victims, victims felt that they were treated less fairly. These findings, therefore, support the view that perceptions of unfairness are not necessarily incompatible with attempts to perceive a situation as a just one; there is evidence that victims were disturbed and were actively attempting to perceive their situation as an equitable one.

Despite the finding that inequitably treated individuals will attempt to reduce their distress by justification, the behavior of the victims did not appear to fit traditional hydraulic notions. Justification was not associated with a reduction in other modes of equity restoration. In view of this difficulty, it may be fruitful to view the apparent justifications from a somewhat different perspective. One possibility is suggested by a series of recent studies which have documented the victim's motivations to perceive that he is controlling his outcomes.

The failure to obtain the predicted relationships between retaliation and justification may be due to the different motivational bases of the two response modes. Whereas retaliation seems

most clearly linked to a motivation to restore equity, justification could be motivated both by a need to perceive that one effectively controls the environment, and by the motivation to restore equity.[1] Within this perspective victimization is expected to arouse feelings of loss of control as well as feelings of inequity. In some cases the perception that one no longer controls his outcomes may be the more important consequence of victimization. This approach would be consistent with theoretical perspectives that propose that mastery of the environment is intrinsically rewarding. Among such concepts are White's (1959) notion of effectance motivation, Deci's (1972) intrinsic motivation, deCharms' (1968) personal causation, and Rotter and Mulry's (1965) view of locus of control as a motive.

If perceptions of control are intrinsically rewarding, and if victims are viewed as having in some measure lost control over their outcomes, then victims should be motivated to resist the perception of loss of control. Such a tendency for victims to seek perceptions of control over their outcomes has been observed in many studies of victims of catastrophes, natural disasters, disease, and crime. Bulman and Wortman (1977) found that real life victims of paralyzing accidents appeared to attribute more blame to themselves than objective circumstances would warrant. Lifton (1963) reported

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[1]It has also been suggested by political observers that retaliation may serve the function of increasing the perceptions of control, as in the cases of colonized populations who realize their capacities for action through violence (Fanon, 1968). However, these feelings of increased control are usually seen as the result rather than the motivator of the retaliation.

strong feelings of self-condemnation among victims of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. Abrams and Finesinger (1953) found feelings of guilt in a high proportion of cancer patients; there was a striking tendency for them to believe that their cancer had been caused by their misdeeds. Medea and Thompson (1970) reported that guilt was a very characteristic reaction among women who had been raped. These authors suggest that self-blame may often be unwarranted and apparently senseless, but it may still be less painful and frightening than the alternative of viewing the world as a place where catastrophes can fall upon innocent persons on a random basis.

Apparently self-blame may be psychologically useful to victims because it implies that they exert some control over their outcomes. Perceptions of control have often been alleged to be important for human functioning. For example, Seligman (1974) has argued that reactive depression may have its roots in feelings of loss of control over one's outcomes. Similar allegations about the greater adaptiveness of personal control attributions have been made by researchers in the area of internal-external control (e.g. Phares, 1976; Gore and Rotter, 1963; Rotter, 1966). Laboratory studies indeed suggest that even illusory perceived control may be effective in alleviating victims' distress. In these studies, researchers manipulated perceptions of control over aversive stimulation. Subjects were given the mistaken impression that they could control high-intensity noise (Glass and Singer, 1973; Glass, Reim and Singer, 1971; Pennebaker, Burnam, Schaeffer and Harper, 1977) or electric shock (Averill and Rosenn, 1972; Bowers, 1968; Geer, Davidson, and

Gatchel, 1970; Glass, Singer, Leonard, Krantz and Cohen, 1973). Compared to subjects in the no-control conditions, subjects in the perceived-control conditions generally reported the aversive stimuli as less painful, displayed less physiological stress, and showed less impairment in task performance following the termination of the aversive stimuli.

Many strands of field and laboratory research thus appear to converge on the interpretation that victims are motivated to perceive that they control their outcomes. Apparently, if a victim can blame himself for what happens to him, then he can at least feel that he exerts a measure of control over what happens to him. These considerations suggest that studies of victims' responses to inequity should pay close attention to the role of the intrinsically rewarding aspects of perceived control of the victim's outcomes. As the equity theory formulations alone appear to fall short of expectations in their applications to the behavior of victims, future research would do well to employ designs to explore the relative contributions of the drive toward perceived control and the drive toward equity. This may not prove to be an easy task, as the two hypothesized drives may often lead to many similar consequences. For example, both the drive toward equity and the drive toward control predict the occurrence of self-blame in victims. In the context of equity motivation self-blame is expected because it allows the victim to lower his perceived inputs, thus making his low outcomes more acceptable. In the context of a drive toward perceived control, self-blame is expected in victims because it offers them a means of perceiving that they control their outcomes.

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APPENDIX A

Preliminary Considerations and Results of Three Pilot Studies

An important issue in the application of equity theory to the area of victims concerns the assessment of the value and relevance of the inputs and outcomes in the situation. Unless there is agreement concerning which inputs and outcomes should be considered relevant, and concerning their weighting, it is difficult to see how a consensus about judgments of equity and inequity could be reached. If the theory is to make general predictions, there must be a reasonable degree of agreement concerning these assessments of inputs and outcomes.

Equity theory was originally formulated to deal with economic transactions, where inputs and outcomes appear more universally recognized and apparently are more readily quantifiable (e.g. hours of work, dollars of pay, days of vacation time, etc.). In non-economic relationships such as harmdoing and helping behaviors the inputs and outcomes may not be as readily quantifiable or as universally agreed upon. If this is the case, equity theory may still serve as a useful framework within which a particular individual's behavior may be analyzed, once his evaluation of the inputs and outcomes in the situation has been obtained. On the other hand, if there is a fair degree of agreement on the value and relevance of inputs and outcomes even in non-economic relationships, more

general predictions may be possible. This question was the object of a preliminary study.

Another difficult question confronting equity theorists is the selection of the person who should determine whether or not inequity exists in a given situation. In Walster et. al.'s (1973) formulation, it is emphasized that equity exists in the eye of the beholder, who can be either a participant or an observer:

> We define an equitable relationship to exist when a person scrutinizing the relationship--who can be Participant A, Participant B, or an outside observer--perceives that all participants are receiving equal relative outcomes from the relationship. (p. 153)

However, the discussion which follows generally assumes that it is the participant's perception of inequity which is most relevant to his behavior. Thus, the authors proceed to state a central proposition in the following terms: "Individuals who discover that they are in an inequitable relationship will feel distress and will attempt to eliminate their distress by restoring equity" (Walster et. al., 1973, p. 154). How does this statement relate to the various hypothesized equity-restoring responses? According to the theory, a victim is first assumed to perceive inequity, feel distress, and then select restitution, retaliation or justification as a means of restoring equity. As far as the restitution-seeking and retaliation responses are concerned, this sequence of events seems plausible. It is logical that one must first perceive inequity and feel distress before taking steps to restore the actual or material equity balance. However, one could question the correctness of the proposed sequence of inequity-perception, distress, and equity

restoration in the case where justification is a response to inequity. In this case it is conceivable that neither inequity nor distress may be experienced, since justification is a means to avoid the perception of inequity.

If it is indeed the case that victims who justify do not at any time perceive inequity, then their evaluation of the situation cannot be relied upon to determine whether their relationship is inequitable (and consequently whether they can be called victims). One possible way out of this dilemma would be to use non-involved persons as outside observers. If several of these observers concurred in the perception of inequity, then that situation may be less ambiguously designated as an inequitable one. Otherwise, equity or inequity in a situation may have to be determined by the researcher, who would make inferences on the basis of the total situational context. Therefore, the possibility of using outside observers to determine inequity was explored in a second study.

Results of two preliminary studies. In order to assess the degree of agreement concerning which inputs and outcomes were considered relevant, 22 female introductory psychology students were given a questionnaire (see Appendix A-1) which required them to judge the major inputs and outcomes in three types of situations: an employment situation, a crime and punishment situation, and a help-giving situation. Using as a criterion the 50% level of agreement, only the employment situation produced agreement concerning the major inputs and outcomes of the participants. No such consensus was

obtained in the case of the crime and help-giving situations; in those situations, there was agreement on only two of the four input-outcome elements. On the basis of this preliminary study, it was decided to begin with a study involving a form of economic injustice.

A study was then performed to test the feasibility of using outside observers to determine the existence of inequity. The rationale for this approach was the fear that victims who justify may fail to perceive inequity when it is present. This possibility was assessed by asking 34 female undergraduate psychology students to respond to one of two forms of a questionnaire (see Appendix A-2). The questionnaire described three employment situations in which one person (the victim) appeared to be treated inequitably. In one condition subjects were asked to role-play the victim's perceptions of inputs and outcomes in the situation, and to imagine the victim's feelings concerning the fairness of the treatment he received. In the second condition subjects were asked to assess the fairness and inputs and outcomes of the situation as objectively and impartially as possible.

In the comparison between victims' and observers' answers, no significant differences emerged. Thus, it was not possible, using this role-play technique, to obtain the hypothesized differential assessments concerning equity evaluations. Accordingly, this approach to the determination of inequity was set aside; it was decided to simply focus on situations which the researcher felt he could convincingly demonstrate to be inequitable.

Study #3. Preliminary investigation of the status of the harmdoer as a factor in the victim's response to inequity. The rationale for the selection of the status variable and for the selection of the hypothesis is presented in the introduction to the dissertation. The major prediction was that compared to those victimized by low-status harmdoers, those victimized by high-status harmdoers would show greater justification. Following a survey of the research literature on status dimensions, five of the major status dimensions were selected for study: power, income, education, competence, and occupation. These were manipulated using the following experimental procedure.

The subject was told that he would participate in a visual perception study in which he would make estimates of the numbers of dots on slides presented at an exposure time of about ½ second. He was told that for each estimate that was correct within 10% limits, he would receive 25 cents; the reward was explained on the basis that it was necessary to insure uniformly high motivational levels for the task.

When a series of 40 slides had been presented, the experimenter asked the subject to fill in a rating form while the experimenter checked the accuracy of his estimates. This form required the subject to make ratings of the experimenter on the five status dimensions of interest, and on the experimenter's similarity to the subject. This procedure was explained by telling the subject that various perceptual variables were suspected of influencing the accuracy of the estimates, and for these reasons he was being asked

to rate various aspects of the experimental situation.

The subject was then told that he had made nine correct estimates, which would give him $2.25, but that the money was not available. He was then thanked for his help, and his experimental credit card was signed by the experimenter. As the subject was leaving, the experimenter casually asked the subject to fill in an experiment evaluation form supposedly required by a research supervisor; he was asked to drop this form in a box outside the supervisor's door down the hall. This evaluation form constituted the measure of justification and perceived inequity, as it required the subject to rate the perceived inputs and outcomes in the situation. The experimenter secretly observed the subject and intercepted him as he dropped the form in the box, and led the subject back to the experimental room for debriefing (see Appendix A-3 for the evaluation form).

Within the procedure described above were manipulated the five dimensions of status. Two levels of each status dimensions were administered as follows. Subjects in the high-power condition were told that the experimenter had been given the responsibility to run the study "pretty much the way he thought was best." Subjects in the low-power conditions were told that the experimenter had been told to follow the research supervisor's instructions very closely, without making any adjustments even when the experimenter felt it would be appropriate. Competence was manipulated by having the experimenter mention that he had obtained either a high score in the experimental task (high-competence condition) or a low score

(low-competence condition). In a high-education condition, the experimenter described himself as a senior graduate student working on the last stages of his doctoral program; in a low-education condition, the experimenter said that he had worked awhile after high school, and now had a job helping with experiments and was taking first-year university courses on a part-time basis. High-occupation experimenters presented themselves as industrial psychologists who were participating in the university's research program; low-occupation experimenters presented themselves as part-time mail sorters in the university post office who were earning some extra money by helping run some experiments. Finally, high-income experimenters mentioned that they were getting $700/month for their participation, while low-income experimenters mentioned that they were receiving $40/month.

In addition to these ten conditions, two additional control groups were run; in one condition subjects were victimized but no status manipulation was introduced, and in another condition neither the status nor the victimization variables were introduced. Five male undergraduate students were run in each of the 12 conditions, for a total of 60 subjects. Six subjects who had shown suspicion of the procedure on a post-experimental questionnaire were not included in the analysis; to obtain equal cell numbers, six additional subjects were run.

The results were analyzed separately for each dimension of status, using a two-group (high- and low-status), one-way analysis of variance. A similar analysis was performed using the two control groups.

The manipulation checks for status perceptions indicated significant effects for the dimensions of occupation and education only. Subjects rated the high-occupation experimenter as having a higher level occupation ($p<.05$), and the high-education experimenter was seen as having a higher level occupation ($p<.05$) and as being more competent ($p<.05$). Also subjects rated the high-occupation experimenter higher on all seven of the status ranking scales ($p<.01$ by the binomial distribution for direction of difference tests). Subjects also rated the high-education experimenter as higher on six of the seven status ratings scales ($p<.06$ by the binomial distribution). The other three status variables did not produce significant or consistent effects on the manipulation check questions.

Comparison of the two control groups in which status was not manipulated did not show a significant effect for rated fairness of treatment, although victims reported that they had been treated less fairly than did non-victims; their means were 2.2 and 1.4 respectively on a 7-point rating scale from "very fair" (1) to "very unfair" (7). It is noteworthy, however, that a very similar pattern of results gave means of 2.7 and 1.5 for victimized and non-victimized groups respectively in another study using this paradigm (Gareau, 1973). With larger numbers of subjects, these means were significantly different in the latter study. In the present study, the non-victimized group rated the experimenter as more educated than the victimized group ($p<.025$), although the experimenter's status was not manipulated in these groups. The

lower ratings given by the victims to the experimenter could be seen as stemming from their resentment of their unfair treatment; this effect would suggest that the victimization had been successful.

Justification data. There was no indication that subjects victimized by high-status harmdoers rated their treatment more fairly than did subjects victimized by low-status harmdoers. With respect to the ratings of inputs and outcomes, two significant effects consistent with predictions were obtained. Compared to victims of low-power harmdoers, victims of high-power harmdoers reported that they exerted less effort in the experimental task ($p<.05$); thus victims of high-power harmdoers perceived their inputs as lower. Compared to victims of low-power harmdoers, victims of high-power harmdoers said they enjoyed the task more ($p<.05$); thus victims of high-power harmdoers appeared to be overestimating their own outcomes. Contrary to predictions, however, victims of the high-power harmdoers said that the harmdoer enjoyed his work more than so indicated by the victims of the low-power harmdoers ($p<.05$); thus the high-power harmdoer's outcomes were perceived as greater than the low-power harmdoer's outcomes.

Correlational data. Subjects' perceptions of the status dimensions were moderately intercorrelated. The following intercorrelations were significant at the .01 level: occupation and education ($r=.43$); occupation and income ($r=.49$); income and education ($r=.35$) and education and competence ($r=.47$). There were no significant

correlations between status perceptions of the harmdoer and perceptions of having been treated fairly or unfairly. In accordance with the predictions, perceptions of the harmdoers as enjoying a high occupational level were related to greater enjoyment of the task by the victims (r=.47); thus perceptions of the harmdoers as higher in status facilitated justification. On the other hand, two correlations ran counter to expectations about justification and status perceptions. Perception of the harmdoer as more competent was associated with perceived greater effort by the victim (r=.41), and perceptions of the harmdoer as having a higher occupational level were associated with the perception that the harmdoer's work was more enjoyable (r=.37).

In conclusion, there is little evidence to confirm a relation between the harmdoer's status and the victim's use of justification processes. Also of concern was the indication that the manipulation of only two status dimensions, occupation and education, have been successful. The evidence for the success of the victimization manipulation was weak, but it was consistent with an internal analysis and with a previous study. In view of these inconclusive results, it was decided to re-investigate the occupation status variable in a different manner, and to investigate further some of the basic assumptions of equity theory as applied to the responses of victims (see introductory chapter).

Appendix A-1. Experimental materials used in pilot study #1.

This is a pre-test of a questionnaire designed to discover what makes various situations seem fair or unfair. There are no correct or incorrect answers, since it is your opinions which are of interest.

For each of the questions below, check (✓) the answer of your choice. It is important that you select only one answer, so if you are in doubt, choose the answer you agree with most.

1. In an employment situation, what is generally the major consideration used to determine an employee's starting salary?

   1 a) the age of the employee
   9 b) the job experience of the employee in a similar setting.
   * 11 c) the years of training or education of the employee.
   1 d) other (please specify): _____

2. In an employment situation, what should be the major consideration used to determine an employee's starting salary?

   ___ a) the age of the employee.
   8 b) the job experience of the employee in a similar setting.
   5 c) the years of training or education of the employee.
   9 d) other (please specify): _____

3. After an employee has worked at a job for some time, what is generally the major consideration in determining his salary?

   1 a) the age of the employee.
   4 b) the job experience of the employee in a similar setting.
   3 c) the years of training or education of the employee.
   * 12 d) the employee's actual work performance on that particular job.
   2 e) other (please specify): _____

4. After an employee has worked at a job for some time, what should be the major consideration in determining his salary?

   ___ a) the age of the employee.
   ___ b) the job experience of the employee in a similar setting.
   ___ c) the years of training or education of the employee.
   * 21 d) the employee's actual work performance on that particular job.
   1 e) other (please specify): _____

(* indicates over 50% of respondents chose the same answer)

5. In most employment situations, what <u>is</u> the major benefit that an employee receives?

3 a) a feeling of security.
____ b) the opportunity to do something interesting or useful.
* 18 c) the actual salary.
____ d) good working conditions.
____ e) other (please specify): _____

6. In most employment situations, what <u>should be</u> the major benefit that an employee receives?

1 a) a feeling of security.
* 12 b) the opportunity to do something interesting or useful.
____ c) the actual salary.
3 d) good working conditions.
6 e) other (please specify): _____

7. In most employment situations, what <u>is</u> the major benefit that an employer receives from his employees?

* 20 a) the actual work performance of the employees.
1 b) the experience and training of the employees.
____ c) the loyalty of the employees.
1 d) other (please specify): _____

8. In most employment situations, what <u>should be</u> the major benefit that an employer receives from his employees?

* 12 a) the actual work performance of the employees.
3 b) the experience and training of the employees.
1 c) the loyalty of the employees.
4 d) other (please specify): _____

9. In most employment situations, what <u>is</u> it that costs an employer the most to give to his employees?

____ a) a feeling of security.
3 b) the opportunity to do something interesting or useful.
6 c) the actual salary.
* 11 d) good working conditions.
____ e) other (please specify): _____

10. In most employment situations, what <u>should it be</u> that costs an employer the most to give to his employees?

2 a) a feeling of security.
4 b) the opportunity to do something interesting or useful.
5 c) the actual salary.
8 d) good working conditions.
3 e) other (please specify): _____

11. When a person is declared to be guilty of breaking a law, what is generally the major consideration in determining his punishment?

4 a) the actual amount of harm done.
___ b) the amount of harm which could possibly have resulted.
2 c) the good or bad intentions of the lawbreaker, when the offense was committed.
___ d) the amount of guilt or remorse felt by the lawbreaker.
7 e) the number of previous offenses by that same person.
4 f) the number of similar offenses committed by other persons around that time.
4 g) other (please specify): _____

12. When a person is declared to be guilty of breaking a law, what should generally be the major consideration in determining his punishment?

6 a) the actual amount of harm done.
2 b) the amount of harm which could possibly have resulted.
4 c) the good or bad intentions of the lawbreaker, when the offense was committed.
1 d) the amount of guilt or remorse felt by the lawbreaker.
2 e) the number of previous offenses by that same person.
1 f) the number of similar offenses committed by other persons around that time.
5 g) other (please specify): _____

13. Suppose a lawbreaker is convicted of an offense, and a certain punishment is given. In most of these situations, which one of the following is most likely to hurt or affect him the most?

* 12 a) the actual fine or imprisonment imposed.
8 b) the embarrassment and shame of being convicted of a crime.
___ c) the disapproval of the judge.
2 d) other (please specify): _____

14. Suppose a lawbreaker is convicted of an offense, and a certain punishment is given. In most of these situations, which one of the following should be most likely to hurt or affect him the most?

7 a) the actual fine or imprisonment imposed.
* 11 b) the embarrassment and shame of being convicted of a crime.
___ c) the disapproval of the judge.
3 d) other (please specify): _____

15. Generally, what <u>is</u> it that gives a judge the right to sentence an offender?

___ a) he has high moral character.
1 b) he is protecting society as a whole.
2 c) he has many years of legal training.
* 15 d) the government has given him the authority to hear cases and give out sentences.
3 e) other (please specify): _____

16. Generally, what <u>should it be</u> that gives a judge the right to sentence an offender?

___ a) he has high moral character.
5 b) he is protecting society as a whole.
3 c) he has many years of legal training.
5 d) the government has given him the authority to hear cases and give out sentences.
6 e) other (please specify): _____

17. When a judge sentences a lawbreaker, what <u>is</u> it that generally gives him the most satisfaction?

5 a) the knowledge that he is administering justice.
7 b) the knowledge that he is protecting society.
5 c) the knowledge that he is doing his job satisfactorily.
2 d) the feeling of power over the lawbreaker.
___ e) other (please specify): _____

18. When a judge sentences a lawbreaker, what <u>should it be</u> that generally gives him the most satisfaction?

8 a) the knowledge that he is administering justice.
5 b) the knowledge that he is protecting society.
6 c) the knowledge that he is doing his job satisfactorily.
___ d) the feeling of power over the lawbreaker.
1 e) other (please specify): _____

19. Think of situations where people help others in trouble. In general, what <u>is</u> it that costs the helpers most in giving the help?

7 a) the time lost.
* 12 b) the inconvenience.
___ c) the embarrassment.
___ d) the money spent.
3 e) other (please specify): _____

20. Think of situations where people help others in trouble. In general, what <u>should it be</u> that costs the helpers most?

6 a) the time lost.
6 b) the inconvenience.
___ c) the embarrassment.
1 d) the money spent.
7 e) other (please specify): _____

21. In general, what do you think <u>is</u> the most rewarding for those who help others?

3 a) the helper may get help when <u>he</u> needs it.
4 b) the helper feels good because of the gratitude expressed by the person he has helped.
7 c) the helper feels good because of the social approval which he receives.
7 d) the helper feels good because he knows what he did was right according to his own conscience.
___ e) other (please specify): _____

22. In general, what do you think <u>should be</u> the most rewarding for those who help others?

2 a) the helper may get help when <u>he</u> needs it.
2 b) the helper feels good because of the gratitude expressed by the person he has helped.
___ c) the helper feels good because of the social approval which he receives.
* 17 d) the helper feels good because he knows what he did was right according to his own conscience.
1 e) other (please specify): _____

23. In general, what <u>is</u> it that costs the most for the person who is receiving help?

4 a) the embarrassment of being noticed and causing "trouble."
4 b) the shame of admitting that he cannot handle the situation by himself.
7 c) the feeling that he is bothering others.
2 d) the dislike of admitting that others are more capable than he is.
3 e) other (please specify): _____

24. In general, what is it that <u>should</u> cost the most for the person who is receiving help?

2 a) the embarrassment of being noticed and causing "trouble."
1 b) the shame of admitting that he cannot handle the situation by himself.

6 c) the feeling that he is bothering others.
4 d) the dislike of admitting that others are more capable than he is.
6 e) other (please specify): _____

25. In general, when a person receives help from another, what is his major benefit?

* 16 a) the actual help received.
5 b) the feeling that others care for him.
___ c) the feeling that he is giving others the opportunity to do a good deed.
___ d) other (please specify): _____

26. When a person receives help from another, what should be his major benefit?

6 a) the actual help received.
* 12 b) the feeling that others care for him.
___ c) the feeling that he is giving others the opportunity to do a good deed.
2 d) other (please specify): _____

COMMENTS?

Appendix A-2. Experimental materials used in pilot study #2.

Read the case study below, and answer the questions as objectively and impartially as possible.

Harvey, a 12-year-old boy, was walking downtown with a friend. Tom, a young man who is 20 years old, happened to walk by.

Harvey pointed to Tom, and said in a fairly loud voice: "Gee, look at the funny jacket that guy is wearing."

When Tom heard this, he walked up to Harvey, and grabbed him by the collar. "What's so funny, kid?" he said roughly. Tom then gave Harvey a shake that ripped the buttons off the boy's shirt. Harvey fell on the sidewalk and scraped his arm quite badly. Then Tom walked away.

1. Rate the fairness of the above general situation.

very fair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very unfair

2. Rate the amount of injury suffered by Tom.

very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

3. Rate the amount of injury suffered by Harvey.

very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

4. How much did Tom deserve what happened to him?

very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

5. How much did Harvey deserve what happened to him?

very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

6. Comments?

_____

_____

_____

Read the case study below, and answer the questions as objectively and impartially as possible.

Bill and Henry have been hired as summer assistants in the provincial urban planning department. Both of them plan to resume their courses in the fall. For the summer months, they will assist a senior analyst in the assessment of several alternative zoning plans for the Edmonton downtown area.

Bill, who is 21, has completed 2 years of an Arts degree; his major area of interest is urban sociology. He has been offered $425 a month for the summer job.

Henry, who is 20, has completed the first year of a course in architectural design. He has been offered $340 a month for the summer job.

Both students have accepted the job offers; no other job offers were available to them.

1. Rate the fairness of the above general situation.

   very fair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very unfair

2. Rate the qualifications of Bill for the summer job.

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

3. Rate the qualifications of Henry for the job.

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

4. Rate the benefits obtained by Bill in the summer job (including salary benefits, future career experience, etc.).

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

5. Rate the benefits obtained by Henry in the summer job (including salary benefits, future career benefits, etc.).

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

6. Comments?

   _____

   _____

   _____

Read the case study below, and answer the questions as objectively and impartially as possible.

Mr. Freedman owns a small printing business. Mr. Langley, who is handicapped by a wooden leg, is the most productive of Mr. Freedman's three employees.

For two years, Mr. Freedman has been paying Mr. Langley $2.34 an hour, although the going rate for printers if $4.71 an hour. Because of his disability, Mr. Langley had been unable to find work elsewhere.

1. Generally, how fair is this general situation?

   very fair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very unfair

2. On the basis of the information presented above, rate the qualifications of Mr. Langley for the job of printer.

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

3. Rate the benefits obtained by Mr. Langley in his work.

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

4. Rate the service provided by Mr. Langley to Mr. Freedman.

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

5. Rate the salary paid by Mr. Freedman to Mr. Langley.

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

6. Comments?

_____

_____

_____

Instructions: Read the case study below, and answer the questions the way you think Harvey would feel.

Harvey, a 12-year-old boy, was walking downtown with a friend. Tom, a young man who is 20 years old, happened to walk by.

Harvey pointed to Tom, and said in a fairly loud voice: "Gee, look at the funny jacket that guy is wearing."

When Tom heard this, he walked up to Harvey, and grabbed him by the collar. "What's so funny, kid?" he said roughly. Tom then gave Harvey a shake that ripped the buttons off the boy's shirt. Harvey fell on the sidewalk and scraped his arm quite badly. Then Tom walked away.

Rate the following questions with a check (✓) the way you think Harvey would feel.

1. Rate the fairness of the above general situation.

   very fair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very unfair

2. Rate the amount of injury suffered by Tom.

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

3. Rate the amount of injury suffered by Harvey.

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

4. How much did Tom deserve what happened to him?

   very much ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very little

5. How much did Harvey deserve what happened to him?

   very much ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very little

6. Comments?

   _____

   _____

   _____

Instructions: Read the case study below, and answer the questions the way you think Henry would feel.

Bill and Henry have been hired as summer assistants in the provincial urban planning department. Both of them plan to resume their courses in the fall. For the summer months, they will assist a senior analyst in the assessment of several alternative zoning plans for the Edmonton downtown area.

Bill, who is 21, has completed 2 years of an Arts degree; his major area of interest is urban sociology. He has been offered $425 a month for the summer job.

Henry, who is 20, has completed the first year of a course in architectural design. He has been offered $340 a month for the summer job.

Both students have accepted the job offers; no other job offers were available to them.

Rate the following questions with a check (✓) the way you think Henry would feel.

1. Rate the fairness of the above general situation.

   very fair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very unfair

2. Rate the qualifications of Bill for the summer job.

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

3. Rate the qualifications of Henry for the job.

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

4. Rate the benefits obtained by Bill in the summer job (including salary benefits, future career experience, etc.).

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

5. Rate the benefits obtained by Henry in the summer job (including salary benefits, future career benefits, etc.).

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

6. Comments?

_____

_____

_____

Instructions: Read the case story below, and answer the questions the way you think Mr. Langley would feel.

Mr. Freedman owns a small printing business. Mr. Langley, who is handicapped by a wooden leg, is the most productive of Mr. Freedman's three employees.

For two years, Mr. Freedman has been paying Mr. Langley $2.34 an hour, although the going rate for printers is $4.71 an hour. Because of his disability, Mr. Langley had been unable to find work elsewhere.

Rate the following questions with a check (✓) the way you think Mr. Langley would feel.

1. Generally, how fair is this general situation?

   very fair ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very unfair

2. On the basis of the information presented above, rate the qualifications of Mr. Langley for the job of printer.

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

3. Rate the benefits obtained by Mr. Langley in his work.

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

4. Rate the service provided by Mr. Langley to Mr. Freedman.

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

5. Rate the salary paid by Mr. Freedman to Mr. Langley.

   very high ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ very low

6. Comments?

   _____

   _____

   _____

Appendix A-3. Manipulation check form for status of harmdoer: pilot study #3.

Instructions: In some experiments it has been found that a person's perceptions and assessments of the situation can affect the accuracy of his visual-perception estimates. In order to allow us to check out these possibilities, please answer the following questions, by making a check mark (✓) to show your answer.

A. Rate your impression of the room you are in now:

very bright	_ _ _ _ _ _ _	very dark
very pleasant	_ _ _ _ _ _ _	very unpleasant
very small	_ _ _ _ _ _ _	very large
very noisy	_ _ _ _ _ _ _	very quiet
very formal	_ _ _ _ _ _ _	very informal

B. Rate your general impressions of the experimenter:

very competent	_ _ _ _ _ _ _	very incompetent
very friendly	_ _ _ _ _ _ _	very unfriendly
well educated	_ _ _ _ _ _ _	less educated
very controlling	_ _ _ _ _ _ _	not controlling at all
high income	_ _ _ _ _ _ _	low income
very formal	_ _ _ _ _ _ _	very informal
very dominating	_ _ _ _ _ _ _	not dominating at all
high-level occupation	_ _ _ _ _ _ _	low-level occupation
very powerful	_ _ _ _ _ _ _	not powerful at all
similar to me	_ _ _ _ _ _ _	not similar to me

C. Rate your general impressions of yourself during the number estimates:

very alert _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ not at all alert

quick reaction time _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ slow reaction time

Appendix A-3. Justification questionnaire used in pilot study #3.

Student evaluations of research program on number estimation experiments #51 ZETA, #84 DALLEE, #102 OPIC, #87 KOBIT

The Department of Psychology would like to obtain student feedback about experiments in the new research program on number estimation. Since it is hoped that your views may help improve the research program, you are being asked to give your general evaluation of the experiment you have participated in.

Please take a few minutes to fill out this evaluation. When you have answered the questions, place this form in the box provided. Write down the date and the name of the experiment below, but do not sign your name or I.D. number.

Thank you for your help.

Dr. B. G. Rule
Research Supervisor
Dept. of Psychology

Note: For each question, mark a "✓" on one of the lines (✓).

Date: _____

Experiment name and no.: _____

1. How enjoyable did you find the task you were asked to do in this experiment (estimating numbers, dots, triangles, or whatever figures were involved)?

   very enjoyable _ _ _ _ _ _ _ not enjoyable at all

2. How competent would you say the experimenter was?

   very competent _ _ _ _ _ _ _ very incompetent

3. Compared to most people, how would you rate your ability to do the particular estimation required by the experiment you were in?

   very good _ _ _ _ _ _ _ very poor

4. How would you describe the difficulty of the experimenter's work in this experiment?

   very difficult _ _ _ _ _ _ _ very easy

5. How much would you say the experimenter was enjoying his work?

   very much _ _ _ _ _ _ _ very little

6. How well would you estimate the experimenter was being paid?

   very well _ _ _ _ _ _ _ very poorly

7. How much effort would you say you put into making the kind of estimates required by the experiment?

   very much _ _ _ _ _ _ _ very little

8. How much educational value do you feel you obtained in this experiment?

   very much _ _ _ _ _ _ _ very little

9. How fairly would you say you have been treated in this particular experiment?

   very fairly _ _ _ _ _ _ _ very unfairly

10. How clearly was the experiment explained to you?

    very clearly _ _ _ _ _ _ _ very unclearly

11. Could you state in your own words the purpose of the experiment?

    _____

    _____

    _____

12. Comments?

    _____

    _____

    _____

APPENDIX B

Instructions to Subjects

Hi. My name is _____. I'm working with a research team and we're interested in some educational psychology questions. The experiment has two purposes. First, it's being used to gather information about educational materials under consideration for an introductory counselling course. In the course of the experiment, you'll be given materials similar to those being considered for use in the introduction of a counselling psychology course. We'll be asking you questions about the procedure in order to get a sample of student opinion about these educational materials.

Secondly, we want to find out whether students can learn effectively by seeing each other's work. In the past students have often complained that they hardly ever get a chance to see the work of other students. In this experiment we'll be using controlled conditions to see just how much students can gain by seeing each other's work, and by exchanging comments about each other's work.

Now I'll explain the procedure of the experiment. I'll be asking you to go to separate rooms so we can control for subtle forms of non-verbal communication. In each room, you'll find the same case history which is a description of an emotionally disturbed boy, with some questions about the case. One of you will receive instructions to answer the questions right away; the other person will be asked to wait until she has seen the first person's answer, and made comments about those answers. That way, by comparing the

two sets of answers, we can find out if students can learn better by being able to see another student's work. In addition to answering questions about the case study, you'll be asked various questions about your impressions of this method of introducing students to counselling concepts.

I'd like one of you now to flip a coin so we can decide completely randomly which one of you will go into room #1, and which one will go to room #2. Then you'll go into the rooms and follow the instructions on each desk. When you finish, I'd like you to stay in your rooms, and I'll be bringing you forms from one room to another. For example, after the first person has answered the questions, I'll bring the answers to the second person so she can see them and make comments about them. Then the first person will receive the comments about her work and will then make comments about the second person's work. There will also be additional forms to fill out, and I'll be explaining these as we go along. As I mentioned before, I'd like you to remain in your separate rooms during the experiment. When the experiment is over, I'll bring you back to this room to give you credit for the experiment and to answer any additional questions you might have. O.K. Is that clear? Any questions? (pause) Fine, let's proceed.

APPENDIX C

Case History and Questions

I.D. _____ Name _____ Age _____

How many Psychology courses have you taken before this year? _____

Instructions: The following is an excerpt taken from an actual case history of a disturbed boy. Please read it and answer the questions to the best of your ability. You will have approximately 10 minutes to read the selection and complete the answers.

> The boy, who will be called Mike, was a metis boy aged 10. He first came to our attention when school authorities expelled him from school and referred his mother to a child guidance clinic. He had already long been a disciplinary problem to his mother who found him "impossible." She had had many complaints of stealing and destructive behavior from neighbors but was unable to exert any control over Mike. She frequently resorted to locking Mike in his bedroom, but he usually tore open the screen and escaped through the window. The father had left the family several years before, and the mother was already very busy with three younger children, so Mike was made a ward of the court and placed in the Children's Home, a residential treatment center for mildly disturbed children. The records of Mike's first few weeks in the Home show considerable tantrum behavior and a high rate of stealing, as he could not keep out of the other children's lockers. Mike seemed to establish some positive relationships with a few of the child-care workers, but his relationships with the other children remained poor, as he continued to steal. It was soon decided that before Mike could be helped, his stealing had to be stopped.

Questions about the case study: Suppose you were a psychological consultant called in to help with this case. How would you propose to handle the situation? Please indicate how you feel about the following courses of action by answering YES ___ or NO ___.

1. The boy should have his hands slapped each time he is caught stealing.

YES ___ NO ___

2. The other children should be allowed to punish the boy each time he steals something.

YES ___ NO ___

3. The boy should be sent to a psychologist for intelligence testing.

YES ___ NO ___

4. The boy should be sent to a psychiatrist to be tested for brain damage.

YES ___ NO ___

5. The child care workers should be told not to pay attention to him when he stole something.

YES ___ NO ___

6. The boy should be given personal counselling with his emotional problems.

YES ___ NO ___

7. The boy should be given everything he wants in order to make stealing unnecessary.

YES ___ NO ___

8. The boy should be kept busy all the time so he won't have time to think of stealing.

YES ___ NO ___

9. Each time the boy steals, he should be locked in a cell until he is ready to apologize.

YES ___ NO ___

10. The child care workers should just give him a lot of love and affection so he won't have to steal to get attention.

YES ___ NO ___

APPENDIX D

Harmdoer's ratings of the victim's answers to the questions about the case study

All subjects received the following evaluations of their answers:

18. Consistency shown by the answers

very poor ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ✓ ___ very good

19. Knowledge of psychological principles of behavior

very poor ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ✓ ___ very good

20. Practical nature of suggestions which were approved

very poor ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ✓ ___ very good

21. Choice of new approaches

very poor ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ✓ very good

Additional comments. Depending on the victimization and status conditions they had been assigned to, subjects received the following additional comments.

Feedback received in the non-victimized, low-status-harmdoer conditions.

> Not really. I know absolutely nothing about emotionally disturbed children.[1]

Feedback received in the low-status-harmdoer, victimized conditions.

> Well, the answers may be quite correct in theory. However, even though I know absolutely nothing about emotionally disturbed children, I think your actual performance in dealing

---

[1]Additional comments were handwritten on the evaluation sheet.

with a situation like this would be poor. Just from meeting you, I found that your general attitude was all wrong. You'd be just too rigid in your approach, and not perceptive or sensitive enough to understand the real problem.

Feedback received in the high-status-harmdoer, victimized conditions.

Well, the answers may be quite correct in theory. However, from my experience as assistant director of a summer camp last summer (where we had to deal with some disturbed children), I think your actual performance in dealing with a situation like this would be poor. Just from meeting you, I found that your general attitude was all wrong. You'd be just too rigid in your approach, and not perceptive and sensitive enough to understand the real problem.

Feedback received in the high-status-harmdoer, non-victimized conditions.

Not really. However, this did remind me of my work last summer as assistant director of a summer camp for children--we had to deal with some emotionally disturbed children.

APPENDIX E

Justification Form

Post-experimental questionnaire. We would like to obtain your impressions of this technique as an introduction to the study of counselling concepts. Please answer the following questions by checking one of the spaces for each question.

1. How difficult did you find the task of recommending treatment procedures?

   very difficult _____ very easy

2. How enjoyable did you find the task of recommending treatment procedures?

   very enjoyable _____ not at all enjoyable

3. Compared to most students at your level of studies, how would you rate your ability to decide on treatment procedures suggested in the case study questions?

   very poor _____ very good

4. How difficult would you say it was for the other student to assess your responses?

   very difficult _____ very easy

5. How enjoyable would you say the other student found it to assess your answers?

   very enjoyable _____ not at all enjoyable

6. How much effort do you think the other student put into assessing your answers?

   very much effort _____ very little effort

7. How much effort would you say you put into answering the questions?

   very much effort _____ very little effort

From a counselling perspective, the interaction between students resulting from rating each other's answers may in itself be educational. <u>On the basis of your limited interaction with the other student, could you give your impression of her</u>?

8. very competent _ _ _ _ _ _ _ very incompetent

9. very friendly _ _ _ _ _ _ _ very unfriendly

10. very intelligent _ _ _ _ _ _ _ very unintelligent

11. very well educated _ _ _ _ _ _ _ not at all well educated

12. generally similar to me _ _ _ _ _ _ _ generally not similar to me

13. How much educational value would you say <u>you</u> got from answering the questions?

very much value _ _ _ _ _ _ _ very little value

14. How much educational value would you think the other student got from assessing your answers?

very much value _ _ _ _ _ _ _ very little value

15. How accurate would you say are the other student's assessments of your answers?

very accurate _ _ _ _ _ _ _ very inaccurate

16. How qualified do you think the other student was to assess your answers?

very qualified _ _ _ _ _ _ _ not at all qualified

APPENDIX F

Information Questionnaire Given to Students in Delay Conditions

Questionnaire for experimental counselling situation.

Instructions. In order to help us discover the type of person who can benefit most from this type of counselling-education approach, please answer the following questions.

1. How many sisters do you have? ____ What are their ages? ____

2. How many brothers do you have? ____ What are their ages? ____

3. Have you ever been responsible for the care of your brothers and sisters while your parents were away?

   ____ No

   ____ Yes, but only for one day or less at one time

   ____ Yes, for up to one week at one time

   ____ Yes, for more than one week at one time

4. Have you ever done any babysitting or supervised children other than your brothers and sisters?

   ____ No

   ____ Yes, but less than 10 times

   ____ Yes, more than 10 times

5. Did you enjoy your babysitting experiences?

   ____ I have not had any babysitting experience

   ____ I did not enjoy babysitting at all

   ____ I did not enjoy babysitting very much

   ____ I found babysitting somewhat enjoyable

   ____ I found babysitting very enjoyable

APPENDIX G

Standard Answer Form

Allegedly Filled Out by the Other Subject

All subjects received an answer form indicating that the other subject had given the following answers on the case study questions (see Appendix C).

1. No
2. No
3. No
4. Yes
5. Yes
6. Yes
7. No
8. Yes
9. No
10. Yes

APPENDIX H

Question used to assess restitution-seeking,

and post-experimental questionnaire

17. Would you like to know how an expert on emotionally disturbed children would rate your answers and probable performance in dealing with a situation like the one described in the case history?

would very much like _ _ _ _ _ _ _ not interested at all to know

---

Thank you for helping us with this study. Could you please answer these last two questions?

a) Would you describe in your own words the purpose of this study?

b) Comments or suggestions for further improvement?

Thank you!

APPENDIX I

Correlation Matrix

Numbers of items refer to the questionnaire items as numbered in Appendices D, E, and H

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1									
2	-.25								
3	.17	-.28							
4	.24	-.07	.01						
5	.00	.26	-.14	.16					
6	-.11	.11	.00	-.17	.21				
7	.03	.19	-.01	-.04	.25	.56			
8	-.11	.02	-.15	-.10	-.00	.23	.15		
9	.18	.12	-.09	.04	-.18	-.03	.14	.38*	
10	-.08	.04	.02	-.21	-.06	.31	.28	.61*	.39*
11	-.09	-.04	.09	-.19	-.01	.30	.31	.58*	.23
12	.07	-.08	.00	-.11	-.07	.01	.09	.15	.27
13	-.14	.34	-.22	.12	.33*	.16	.40*	.38*	.25
14	-.09	.06	-.02	-.15	.01	.37*	.25	.49*	.13
15	.01	-.03	.16	-.33	-.29	.04	-.03	.23	.17
16	-.04	-.06	.06	-.44	-.22	.05	.02	.20	.11
17	.09	.19	-.03	.12	.35	.13	.38*	.07	.10
18	-.13	-.11	-.09	-.22	.11	-.01	.12	-.15	-.14
19	.00	-.03	.08	.11	-.03	-.05	.16	-.31	-.25
20	.11	-.01	.06	.10	-.13	-.06	-.05	-.04	.03
21	.18	-.05	-.05	.27	-.05	-.18	-.06	-.38*	-.15

* significant at the .01 level

	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
10									
11	.79*								
12	.25	.15							
13	.13	.19	-.04						
14	.42*	.36	.10	.37*					
15	.27	.33	.25	-.06	.12				
16	.18	.19	.12	.03	.28	.58*			
17	.23	.21	-.11	.41	.08	-.05	.01		
18	-.16	-.08	-.15	-.03	-.09	-.01	-.00	.08	
19	-.25	-.23	-.13	-.13	-.18	-.03	-.38*	.07	.49*
20	-.12	-.30	-.07	-.17	-.08	-.09	-.27	-.03	.35*
21	-.32	-.51*	-.17	-.20	-.15	-.29	-.29	-.09	.14

* significant at the .01 level

	19	20	21
19			
20	.34*		
21	.39*	.53*	

* significant at the .01 level